A day in the “swamp”:understanding discourse in the online counter-jihad nebula by Lee, Benjamin John
1 
 
A Day in the “Swamp”: Understanding Discourse in the Online Counter-Jihad Nebula 
 
Benjamin Lee 




The counter jihad scene can be understood variously as a collection of parties, pundits and 
movements all linked by a common belief that the West is being subject to takeover by 
Muslims. In this paper, I seek to improve academic understanding of this collection of 
movements, parties and ideas by analysing the discourse presented by a collection of online 
advocates whom I describe as the counter jihad nebula. The findings suggest a need to at least 
partially re-evaluate the role of the nebula within the wider counter jihad scene as well as the 
relationship between the wider counter jihad scene and mainstream political discourse as 
expressed through various media outlets.  
Introduction 
The counter jihad scene has been an enigma to researchers, governments, citizens and, in all 
probability, its own supporters. Whilst traditional far-right movements predicated on 
xenophobia and racism are relatively easy to identify, the counter jihad scene emerged as 
something altogether more confusing. It has been referred to in one way or another frequently 
by researchers, in some cases as a mutated form of fascism, in others as a new and distinctive 
movement or scene in its own right. It has been noted as hateful and violent but has also 
appeared to champion of the rights of sexual and religious minorities in some cases, as well 
as claiming to be a staunch defender of the right to free speech. In essence, the counter jihad 
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scene consists of a loose collection of parties, organisations and various associated pundits 
and talking heads united by their belief that they are witnessing an attempted Islamic takeover 
of the West. In this paper I attempt to further academic and policy understanding of the 
counter jihad scene as a whole by examining in detail a much referenced but seldom defined 
online wing described here as the counter jihad nebula (CJN).  The description nebula is 
chosen evoke the indistinct character of the online wing of the counter jihad scene. There are 
no formal qualifications for membership, no barriers to entry and no centralised editorial 
control. This group of websites can be considered part of the counter jihad scene only by their 
shared ideas and sentiments; nevertheless, they have seemingly together formed an important 
component of the wider scene.   Specifically, I aim to partially map and analyse a selection of 
sites within the CJN with the aim of developing a more detailed understanding of how the 
counter jihad narrative permeates through online networks.  
To accomplish this, I first set out to synthesise briefly existing understandings of the wider 
counter jihad scene. Following this, I attempt to give a brief overview of counter jihad 
discourse as recorded by other accounts. I then go on to develop the position that online 
presences are a key element within the counter jihad scene that a distinctive counter jihad 
nebula exists, and highlight some contrasting theories of how such groups manifest online. I 
then outline the methods used and the findings of the analysis, specifically concentrating on 
the ambiguous relationship between the CJN and other, more mainstream, media outlets.  
Conceptions of the counter jihad scene 
Previous work has not addressed the idea of an online CJN specifically. Instead, it has 
frequently referenced the importance of online resources to a wider counter jihad ideology or 
movement. Even this is shadowy and difficult to define. Goodwin offers an interesting 
description of the composite parts of what he terms the “counter-Jihad scene”:  
3 
 
“Within an amorphous network of think-tanks, bloggers and activists, the counter-
Jihad scene incorporates the ‘defence leagues’ in Australia, Denmark, England, 
Finland, Norway, Poland, Scotland, Serbia and Sweden, groups such as Pro-Cologne 
and the Citizens’ Movement Pax Europa in Germany, Generation Identity in France, 
the ‘Stop the Islamization’ networks in Europe and the United States, the American 
Freedom Defense Initiative and the International Civil Liberties Alliance.” 1 
This broad interpretation is reflected in the work of other writers who have addressed specific 
components of the scene. Counter jihad inspired terrorism has stimulated much discussion. In 
his analysis of “lone wolf” terrorism Feldman refers the emergence of a “new far right” 
centred on prejudice against Muslims.2 In contrast, others have analysed anti-Muslim thought 
as a literary genre.3 Similarly, writers such as Gavan Titley, Liz Fekete, Paul Jackson, Jacob 
Ravndal, Toby Archer and Mattias Gardell have explored the relationships between the 
ideology expressed by counter-jihad and the murders perpetrated by Anders Behring 
Brievik.4 For example, Jackson analysed the writings of prominent counter jihad blogger 
Fjordman (AKA Peder Jennings) as reproduced in the Brievik manifesto.5 However, other 
analyses of Brievik have played down the significance of counter jihad bloggers, suggesting 
that Brievik’s prejudices predated the establishment of many blogs (although his views were 
likely subsequently strengthened by material he found online).6 Others have arrived at a 
wider counter jihad movement through the emergence of prominent street movements based 
such as the English Defence League (EDL).7 Joel Busher, for example, undertook extensive 
ethnographic study of the UK-based street movement, highlighting the discourse of members 
and drawing out the role of anti-Muslim thought within the wider movement.8 Also flowing 
from analysis of the EDL, Melagrou-Hitchens and Brun identify “Europe’s Counter-Jihad 
Movement”.9 The counter jihad scene has also been used as a way of illustrating the 
emergence of a European Public Sphere, where it was described as a “loose global 
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fraternity”.10 Outside of academic debate, the counter jihad scene has also been identified in 
work by issue groups such as Hope Not Hate’s report on the counter jihad movement, as well 
as journalistic accounts such as Toby Archer’s contribution to Foreign Policy which inspired 
the title of this paper.11 
Islamification and the decline of the West 
The counter jihad scene has been difficult for scholars to categorise. Some have seen it as 
representing something essentially novel and different from what has gone before, stressing 
that the narrative of the counter jihad is different from that of traditional far right parties. For 
Melagrou-Hitchens and Brun what they describe as the European Counter Jihad Movement is 
a distinctive “identifiable pan-European far-right movement”.12 Along with Goodwin, 
Melagrou-Hitchens and Brun differentiate the counter jihad from traditional anti-immigrant 
and ethnic nationalist groups on the grounds that they do not attempt to develop a wider 
ideological programme and instead focus only on their opposition to Islam.13 Jackson and 
Feldman place the EDL within what they consider the ‘new far right’, highlighting the 
reconfiguration of narratives to avoid unfashionable racial and anti-Semitism whilst still 
reflecting the politics of ‘hate’.14 Other accounts also see the incorporation of anti-Islamic 
themes as being an element in the reconfiguration of traditional far-right narratives, with 
parties replacing anti-Semitism and nationalism with an anti-Islamic narrative based on 
Judeo-Christian values and a sense of shared Europe-wide culture.15 A similar position is 
expressed by Kundnani for whom the counter jihad is “compatible” with older interpretations 
of neo-Nazism in which the predicted race war has been replaced with a cultural one.16 As 
both Matt Goodwin and Joel Busher note, the counter jihad scene is embryonic and the extent 
to which it either develops its own political parties or is able to influence others, in particular 
those who currently occupy the far right spectrum, remains to be seen.17 Equally, the counter 
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jihad scene cannot be viewed as a monolith, it is instead composed of a myriad of different 
ideas and people with indistinct boundaries.18 
Loosely speaking, for the counter jihad scene, Europe and the US are under threat from an 
aggressive and politicised Islamic world that is attempting to take over Europe through a 
process of “Islamification” with the eventual aim of imposing Sharia law. In this process the 
threat is characterised by the perceived removal of Christian or Jewish symbols, the 
imposition of Islamic traditions and the creation of no-go areas for non-Muslims.19 The 
construction of mosques in particular is seen as continued reinforcement of the separation of 
the Muslim population from the wider populous.20 As strong as the threatening practices of 
Muslims in descriptions of the counter jihad are images of a powerless Europe in decline and 
sliding into decadence, unable to resist Islamic take over.21 The idea that European culture in 
particular is in a state of decline, while a spiritually vigorous East represented by Islam is in 
the ascendancy in civil society, is a common sentiment in some circles. Carr points out that 
the argument has found favour with prominent conservative commentators such as Melanie 
Philips and Mark Steyn. 22 In 2004, the historian Niall Ferguson contributed an article to the 
New York Times in which he speculated about “A creeping Islamicization of a decadent 
Christendom”.23 Carr also notes the difference between sarcastic references to Islamic 
immigration and demographic shifts in Europe and belief in a purposive political project, i.e. 
conspiracy.24 In some accounts, belief in the conspiracy is a dividing line between a hard core 
of counter jihad activists and a more mainstream conservative right wing outside the 
boundaries of the counter jihad scene.25 Equally, for Zúquete there remains a divide between 
rational and critical engagement with Islam and irrational, “fear-laden” accounts.26  
The starting point for understanding counter jihad discourse comes from its understanding of 
cultural and political identity. Accounts of extreme right ideology have highlighted the 
distance that many groups have placed between themselves and discourse based on race and 
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biology.27 Where traditional fascist narratives may have been based on pseudo-scientific 
understandings of identity based on genetics or heritage, the question of identity has now 
been transferred very much to the sphere of a wider cultural politics.28 However, it is worth 
noting how authentic many of these transitions have been, with some arguing that these 
changes are merely superficial.29 Melagrou-Hitchens and Brun argue in their interpretation 
that the counter jihad movement is based on what they describe as a form of cultural 
nationalism in which nations and citizens are defined by a shared history, culture and 
values.30 Furthermore, the removal of narrow national and ethnic definitions of identity has 
enabled the counter jihad scene to take on a more international character with organisations 
from different countries co-operating and working together.31 Revised discourses very often 
frame identity at a European or “Western” level, suggesting that the far-right may be moving 
to some degree beyond a simple nationalist interpretation of world events and acquiring a 
more international perspective.32 It is perhaps this factor more than any other that 
distinguishes the counter jihad scene from other parts of the populist right.33 In addition, 
religion is often invoked as an identity shorthand for the “West”. It is important to note that 
this does not always pertain to high levels of religiosity. Breivik, for instance, presented 
himself as a “cultural Christian” as opposed to being personally religious in his manifesto.34 
This position of cultural nationalism leads to a number of other seemingly incongruous 
positions for the counter jihad scene including fervent support for human rights, tolerance and 
free speech in particular in comparisons to counter jihad presentations of illiberal Sharia 
law.35 In addition, possibly as a result of political opportunism, the counter jihad scene is 
often fiercely pro-Israel.36 
Stemming from the positioning of the counter jihad scene as the defenders of “Western 
civilisation” is the extent to which they have seized on Muslims and Islam as the cultural 
other, and the degree to which Muslims are felt to present both an external and internal threat 
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to this identity. For writers that see the counter jihad as an essentially repackaged version of 
the fascist race-war narrative, the position of Muslims in the counter jihad is often seen as 
being analogous to that of the Jewish or Black people in a traditional fascist narrative.37 Some 
writers describe Muslims as being portrayed as “theological automatons” in the counter jihad 
discourse, unified in thought and deed; effectively Muslims are seen as a homogenised and 
hostile mass.38 Islam as a whole is presented as not just a religion but a totalitarian political 
force, and any action that can be linked to this monolithic understanding of “Islam” is 
deployed as evidence in support of hostile intent or action.39 Fekete presents this practice as 
the “essentialising” of Islam: “It is depicted as the same across centuries, backward and 
barbaric since the time of the Prophet, unable and unwilling to adapt to different historical 
and cultural settings.”40 
The choice of Muslims as the main antagonists by counter jihad activists has been presented 
by some as political opportunism and in some cases as a result of a strategic abandonment of 
anti-Semitic themes.41 Exacerbated by the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, and incidents such as the 
murder of Lee Rigby, the position of the Muslim community in Britain and elsewhere has 
come under intense public scrutiny which has been accompanied by increased reporting of 
discrimination experiences.42 For both Fekete and Kundnani, the governmental security 
response to these issues has also been a driving factor in both legitimising the views held by 
counter jihad scene and in overlooking the threat presented by them.43 The popular press has 
also been seen as further legitimising anti-Muslim views.44 Treadwell and Garland’s case 
studies of young men involved in the EDL also point to the connection between hostility to 
Muslims and the perception of socio-economic inequality by EDL members.45 Muslims, in 
this narrative, serve as scapegoats for a variety of broader perceived problems such as 
housing and other government services, a situation further exacerbated, Treadwell and 
Garland argue, by media coverage.46 There is also a degree of variation in the extent to which 
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European Muslims are seen as engaged in Islamisation. Some groups within the counter jihad 
scene acknowledge the existence of moderates.47 Others, however, point to the concept of 
“Taqiyya”, a practice that is seen as allowing a Muslim to deny their faith if it is to the overall 
benefit of Islam. This, they argue, could mean the entire European Muslim population was 
engaged in the same plot.48 
Having established an understanding of “us” based on shared cultural values, and a “them” 
based on a homogenised and hostile Muslim world bent on conquering the West from within, 
the counter jihad scene seeks to explain how this can be allowed. On one level the apparent 
permissiveness of Western societies in allowing Muslims to remain can be interpreted as 
political elites’ weakness or incompetence. In some interpretations, failure to act to prevent 
Islamisation has resulted from political cowardice or greed.49 Very often the blame for 
Islamisation is allocated to multiculturalists, who are seen as enabling the continued threat to 
values and identity presented by Islamisation.50 One favoured term for summarising and 
dismissing progressives or multiculturalists is “cultural Marxists”.51 
On a deeper level, the failure of political and cultural leadership to prevent Islamisation is 
interpreted as sinister. The counter jihad scene has what Kundnani argues is a “structural 
need” for a conspiracy theory in order to explain the apparent political failure.52 One (perhaps 
the predominant) master template for this conspiracy was set down in a book published in 
2005 by an Egyptian born, British citizen living in Switzerland - Giselle Litmann - known 
under her pen name as Bat’Yeor.53 Focusing on a Franco-Arab alliance, Yeor argues that the 
French and the European Community embraced the Arab world in attempt to create a unified 
foreign policy power capable of balancing the United States.54 She also attempts to link 
French collaborators and Nazi sympathisers to this decision, suggesting anti-Semitism as a 
further unifying factor. The end point of Yeor’s analysis is the belief that Europe exists in a 
state of “Dhimmitude”, that is as states subservient to Muslim rulers characterised by 
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“passive submission to intellectual censorship, insecurity, internal violence, and even 
terrorism”. Unsurprisingly, Yeor’s approach has been criticised and her academic 
qualifications questioned.55 
Waging the counter jihad online 
Organisationally, the web is seen as playing a facilitating role within the counter jihad scene, 
allowing various components to share information and coordinate work.56 Toby Archer in 
particular argues that without the web, the transatlantic counter jihad would not have come 
about.57 In further investigation Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun maintain that the use of the 
internet is part of a conscious strategy within the counter jihad scene to adopt a distributed 
organisational model to limit the risks of legal action, unofficial political action from the left 
and the hostility of militant Muslims.58 They further point out that a decentralised 
organisational structure lends itself to consensus decision making and limits the risk of the in-
fighting seemingly endemic in many fringe political groups. Kundnani identifies two key 
areas in which the web has played a role in the formulation of the counter jihad scene.59 He 
identifies the role played by existing online connections between football firms in the early 
days of the EDL as well as the role played by social media in drawing in young people. He 
also acknowledges the influence of “far-right websites” on Breivik’s manifesto.60  
Immediately following the attacks of September the 11th 2001, the internet was reported as 
being a conduit for anti-Islamic sentiment in the form of comments directed towards Muslim 
websites.61 As far back as 2006, online commentators such as Fjordman were identified as 
playing a key role in forwarding the nascent counter jihad ideology.62 Following the 2011 
Breivik killings, greater attention was paid to the counter jihad scene and their online 
inspiration. The Guardian analysed the web pages linked to by Breivik’s manifesto. Amongst 
the morass of sites uncovered, a cluster of 14 nodes were labelled as “counter-jihad”.63 Paul 
Jackson suggests that the website Gates of Vienna is a key space for the reproduction of the 
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writings of Fjordman.64 The influence of anti-Muslim thought online has emerged as a 
common theme in the analyses of Breivik’s manifesto.65 
Further work has attempted to clarify counter jihad thought in various online venues. In 
January 2013 the Amsterdam-based Digital Methods Initiative undertook a four-day 
workshop and ‘data sprint’, using a variety of tools and approaches to learn more about 
counter jihad activities online.66 The initiative looked mainly at the use of social media by 
counter jihad activists, including studies looking at the English Defence League’s use of 
Facebook.67 Again, looking at data scraped from social media, the group found some 
evidence of overlapping memberships of pro-Israeli and counter jihad spaces on both 
Facebook and Twitter, supporting to some extent the theoretical connection between the two 
ideas.68 A further analysis harvested data from Amazon, analysing passages highlighted by 
readers of counter jihad literature to set out a broader conception of counter jihad discourses 
as understood by audiences rather than authors. Users were found to most commonly 
highlight passages implying that Islam was violent. 69 
That the web should feature so heavily in accounts of the counter jihad fits with a broader 
understanding of the role of the web in enabling the bringing together of minority viewpoints 
and reducing legal risks.70 In addition, the web can provide groups with an opportunity to 
circumvent hostile gatekeepers in the mainstream media.71 The web grants the user a huge 
degree of receiver control. Where media such as television and newspapers are relatively 
scarce, linear and fixed, the web offers almost limitless opportunities for users to choose 
content and sources that reflect their own interests.72 The ability to filter content and coalesce 
with like-minded people has been seen by some as of great benefit to consumers and by 
others as having possibly negative effects for democracy.73 The low barriers to entry into the 
online sphere have been singled out by writers such as Nathan Lean as allowing the counter 
jihad scene to develop from a few local pockets of anti-Muslim thought to a broader 
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international movement.74 Sunstein argues that within like-minded communities members are 
likely to be exposed only to one-sided arguments, be keen to match their views to others 
within the same group, and to develop extreme arguments as their initial viewpoints are 
continually confirmed.75 The result, he argues, is the development of polarised communities 
with a predilection for the most extreme viewpoints. For the CJN we can predict that the web 
allows for the continuation of the shared discourse of Islamic takeover in the West that is not 
shared (to the same extent) by the mass media. Beyond this, we might expect that the counter 
jihad would conform to the pattern of an “echo chamber” as set out by Sunstein that is 
avoiding connections with sources that either disagree or challenge the shared discourse of 
Islamic takeover.76 Certainly in the case of Breivik, the use of online space provided him with 
an uncontested reality in which his views were able to develop unchallenged.77   
There is also, however, a strong thread in the academic counter jihad literature that suggests 
advocates of the counter jihad world-view have also been influenced by mainstream 
narratives originating from government and mainstream media. Kundnani makes the case that 
the rise of counter jihadism has been enabled by a “blind spot” in mainstream security 
narratives brought about by the “War on Terror”.78 In this climate, he argues, security 
narratives have come to focus increasingly on values and identity with the effect of tacitly 
endorsing the conceptions of values and identity put forward in counter jihad narratives as 
well as limiting the ability or willingness of state institutions to counter or censure right-wing 
extremist narratives. In other words:  
“…the uncomfortable truth is that the central plank of a terrorist’s [Breivik] 
narrative is shared by the heads of Western European governments.” 79 
Kundnani’s position closely echoes that of Fekete’s earlier concerns over the impact of the 
post 9/11 shift to what she describes as “the security state”.80 Archer also draws attention to 
what he sees as close ties between anti-Muslim blogs and ‘right of centre’ media in the US.81 
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Equally, we can look at mainstream conservative engagement with the Eurabia conspiracy 
and the concept of Islamisation, as well as work looking at the influences on Breivik in order 
to further support the claim that the CJN will have closer connections to mainstream 
narratives and thought than its apparent pariah status might imply.82 If it is the case that 
mainstream discourse has lent the counter jihad ideology greater legitimacy, then we might 
expect to find greater connection to mainstream and government sites within in the online 
counter jihad. 
Mapping and understanding the counter jihad nebula 
Testing the two possible theses, of a closed echo chamber and a more open CJN, was a two-
stage process. Initially, the researcher mapped websites that could be considered to belong to 
the CJN. This was accomplished through the use of two related computer programmes: 
VOSON and NODEXL. VOSON is a tool for collecting hyperlinks and the relationships 
between websites. NODEXL is a plugin for Microsoft Excel which allows the resulting 
network data to be imported and displayed.  
This process is the basis of hyperlink network analysis, which in turn applies methods from 
social network analysis to the relationships between websites. Social network analysis is 
centred on understanding what Scott describes as “relational data” which captures connections 
between actors rather than the attributes of actors themselves (attribute data).83 In this instance, 
however, the structure of the counter jihad nebula is of less importance to understanding the 
composition and resultant discourse within CJN than the attributes of those nodes within it, i.e. 
the extent to which they share in the wider counter jihad discourse. The aim of this study is not 
to map the structure of the entirety, or even most, of the counter jihad nebula, but to establish 
the extent to which counter jihad discourse was reproduced across different nodes connected 
to already well-known central nodes in the network.  
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The hyperlink network analysis was based on a seed set of five sites identified in existing 
academic literature: Gates of Vienna, Brussels Journal, Jihad Watch (Robert Spencer), Atlas 
Shrugs (Pamela Geller) and Politically Incorrect. The group of seed sites was consciously 
chosen to be small so as to ensure that the content within the resulting network and content 
could be realistically analysed. Each of these sites was used as a seed site in a web crawl 
performed through VOSON and analysed using the NodeXL template. The crawl was set to 
collect outgoing links only, to a maximum of 1000 and a page depth of 50. The crawl was 
launched and completed on the 25th of June 2014. The resulting network contained 791 nodes 
joined by 843 links. In order to identify the relevant components, this network was further 
reduced to include only the nodes from the seed set and those that retained more than two 
links from the original seed set. This was done to ensure that nodes included in the analysis 
were considered valid by a minimum of two of the seed sites. This resulted in a set of 46 
websites connected to by two or more of the seed sites. This list was further reduced by 
excluding sites not written in English as being difficult for the (English-speaking) researcher 
to analyse accurately. 
The resulting network was then used as the basis for a qualitative inquiry into the nature of 
the sites included within the resulting network with the aim of determining the extent to 
which the discourses present on identified sites supported, were unrelated to, or contradicted 
the discourse of the counter jihad scene summarised above. Discourse, in this instance, 
represents more than superficial story-telling; instead it represents a broader model of the 
world.84 Where sites linked to a specific item of content such as a video or a single story, this 
was taken as the text corresponding to that node. Where sites linked to a home page of a site 
that did not appear to regularly update, the home page was taken as the basis of the analysis. 
Where a site did update, for example a blog or a news site, and where site design made this 
possible, then the three most recent stories (from the 25th of June) were taken as the texts for 
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analysis.85 This approach aims to capture the content most relevant for the sites inclusion in 
the network at the time of the crawl.  
Structure of the counter jihad nebula 
We can make a number of readily apparent observations looking at the resulting networks 
identified through the web crawl. Of the five seed sites only one site – Jihad Watch - failed to 
produce any outgoing links. Even a cursory examination of Jihad Watch shows that the page 
does include hyperlinks. The failure of Jihad Watch to crawl may indicate a failure with the 
VOSON software or, more likely, that the site contains features that make it difficult to crawl 
using tools such as VOSON.86  
FIGURE ONE PLEASE 
Beyond the seed sites a further 46 sites have been identified. In most examples links were 
directed to home pages rather than specific articles; in a minority, links pointed to specific 
items of content embedded in larger sites. As well as the five sites included in the initial seed 
set, there are a number of additional sites that might easily be included within an explicitly 
defined counter jihad nebula, including The Religion of Peace. More of a surprise has been 
the inclusion of both alternative and mainstream media sites including the BBC, Wall Street 
Journal, Bild and The Daily Mail. In most cases these nodes are included as they feature a 
link to a specific story, although a number of additional media organisations have been 
included in the network without linked to specific stories, representing a more general 
endorsement by the linker. These are difficult to characterise as mainstream and seem to 
represent a more divergent interpretation of right wing politics. Breibart, National Review 
and Hotair all comfortably fit the typology of partisan news platforms. In addition, the 
network also includes a large collection of personal blogs, many of which have been 
abandoned and a number of links to social media or Web 2.0 sites, including Twitter, 
Facebook and Wikipedia.  
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FIGURE TWO PLEASE 
Discourse in the counter jihad nebula 
Within the seed sites the discourse closely matches the themes developed by existing 
literature. In the available corpus, explicit references to the identity of authors were relatively 
scarce, perhaps suggesting that much of this remains implicit. However, on a number of 
occasions it was clear that authors had a fairly general understanding that they were writing 
in the defence of the “West”. For example, Pamela Geller republished two columns she had 
written for the website World Net Daily under the title “Defending the West”.  
Muslims are treated akin to being a homogeneous mass as predicted. In a response to a Mail 
Online article, Robert Spencer rubbishes the claim made in the article that poverty and 
austerity are driving rising extremism, arguing that Islam is the defining factor.87 Geller 
repeats this point in an article commenting on a piece in the Telegraph profiling Nasser 
Muthana, a former British medical student who appeared in an ISIS recruitment video 
sparking public debate on the issue of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq:   
“Well-educated and affluent, the jihadis show that the catalyst for jihad is a move 
toward the faith of Islam. Religiosity is the catalyst.” 88 
For both Geller and Spencer, Islam is presented as being the driving factor behind extremism 
and violence. This reflects their interpretation of Islam as a political ideology rather than a 
disparate global religion, and also the essentialism that leaves little or no room for differing 
interpretations or evolving understanding.  
A simplified interpretation of world events into black and white narratives was also present in 
the more European focused Politically Incorrect. In summarising a video posted by comedian 
Pat Condell explaining his support for Israel, the article suggests:  
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“Everything one needs to know about the Middle East conflict is: The Jews want 
peace, the Arabs don’t because the Arabs hate the Jews for religious reasons and 
want them dead.” 89 
Beyond Muslims, the seed site content was even more critical of political and cultural elites. 
Direct attacks on political leaders were frequent. In an article on the press policy of the 
Obama White House centred on a supposed “gaffe”, a picture of Obama leaning over a 
“sneeze guard” to order food, the author describes Obama as part of an “overweening 
political class” and trying hard to look “normal”.90 Although this is not made explicit in the 
article, this is consistent with the wider counter jihad discourse (and many other 
contemporary political discourses) that presents political leaders as out of touch. This 
position is further hardened in an article posted on Brussels Journal examining the 
propagation of the idea that “violence never solves anything”. This maxim is seen as being 
perpetuated by powerful and shadowy “elites”: 
“The claim tends to come from a closed circle of self-confirming elites. The network 
of the privileged operates in a cell that protects it from contamination by rational 
critique.” 91 
Also evident was hostility towards other figures from civic society such as media pundits that 
were seen to disagree with counter jihad positions. Geller, for example, rounds on the author 
of an article in the Huffington Post attacking the practices of her organisation – American 
Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI). The author – Rabbi Rachel Gartner – is accused of being 
the “bane of Jewish existence: the ‘self-loathing Jew’”.92 Similarly, Spencer, in response to a 
Mail Online article attacks the claims made by Andreas Krieg an academic at King’s College 
London using inverted commas as a tool to question his credentials. He also asserts the 
position “I’d love to debate Andreas Krieg about this question. But I am sure that he would 
refuse to do so.”93 
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Also prevalent in the texts harvested from the seed sites are ideas around the mainstream 
media. For CJN advocates the mainstream media are inherently untrustworthy. Spencer asks 
why papers such as the Mail “rush to exonerate Islam of all responsibility for the ever-
mounting number of atrocities done in its name…”, also referring to the story he is critiquing 
as “palpable nonsense” and describing the Daily Mail as “ever-witless”.94 Returning to 
Obama’s food related gaffe, Gates of Vienna creates a story in which the US President can be 
portrayed as both venal and controlling whilst simultaneously falling out with a press that 
was previously in awe of him: 
“This increasingly disconnected administration doesn’t seem to understand the extent 
to which the MSM [mainstream media] sold its soul to sell him. No matter what they 
did, it wasn’t enough. No one could ever do enough for His Majesty President 
Obama. 24/7 fawning was simply too little.”95 
In addition to the seed sites, a number of sites captured in the hyperlink analysis could 
comfortably fit within the counter jihad nebula. For example The Religion of Peace is 
dominated by coverage of Islam which it argues is “one really messed up religion.” The home 
page of the site features a “weekly jihad report” in which the number of “jihad attacks” and 
“Allah Akbars” (suicide attacks) is recorded.96  
The CJN and the Media 
The critical treatment of the media by the core CJN sites identified above is perhaps 
somewhat contradictory given the extent to which CJN articles are based around reproducing 
media material. Adding to this, the CJN also has a propensity to link to other media sites, 
either directly to specific articles, or to entire sites. In the case of the Wall Street Journal the 
links were to an opinion piece from 2011 written by the founder and leader of the Dutch 
Party for Freedom, Geert Wilders. Wilders is a noted supporter of the of the counter jihad 
scene.97 A further specific mainstream media article comes from the BBC. Posted on 10th 
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October 2012, this piece describes the finding of a Pew research report into the religious 
habits of US citizens. It found that Protestantism was no longer the majority religion and that 
the numbers of people without religious affiliation was rising.98 On both occasions, the 
mainstream media stories have gone some way to supporting the counter jihad discourse, 
either explicitly in the case of the opinion written directly by Wilders in the Wall Street 
Journal, or indirectly in the case of the BBC.  
In addition to specific stories from major national press outlets, a further group of partisan 
media sites such as Breibart, Powerline and National Review were present in the captured 
network. These sites share a noticeably different approach in tone, content and design than 
national press instruments such as the Wall Street Journal or the BBC, and the fact that CJN 
sites link to home pages rather than specific stories on these sites indicates a level of comfort 
with the discourse within. Those editing the CJN core sites are evidently not concerned that 
these sites will significantly challenge their orthodoxy by presenting a contrasting 
perspective. This is further confirmed by some of the explicit relationships between CJN 
authors and this type of site. For instance, Pamela Geller is an active contributor to Breibart.  
Some articles supported the counter jihad discourse, but not explicitly and very often in a 
moderated form. For example, texts collected from Breibart all focus on the Obama 
administration’s record on the US-Mexican border, which is presented as being in a state of 
crisis. Obama is accused of pushing the limit of his powers, through the reporting of a letter 
written by a Republican member of Congress.99 Other stories on the same topic then go on to 
reinforce the perception that a spike in arrivals is being driven by misconceptions of the US 
immigration system caused by the administrations Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
programme. Again, this programme is reported as being “unilaterally enacted” by the 
administration.100 This fits closely with the anti-elitist rhetoric of the CJN, not because the 
Obama administration is seen as soft on terrorism, but because it is on the wrong side of the 
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issue and acting against the common good, an undescribed strong border policy. Equally, 
National Review’s coverage of Hilary Clinton’s personal wealth attempts to portray the 
Clinton’s behaviour as being at odds with the “common man”.101 Furthermore, Clinton’s 
money is differentiated from that of Republican Presidential Candidate Mitt Romney by 
virtue of being gained through speaking fees and book advances as opposed to “creating jobs, 
building wealth and expanding the US economy.” Again, this maintains an anti-elite line, but 
a partisan one.  
This pattern persists on the occasions that partisan media did cover terrorism and security 
related issues. For example, Hot Air covered a report released by the Rand Corporation in 
which analysis of classified and unclassified documents pointed towards an increase in the 
number of jihadist groups, fundamentalist fighters and attacks carried out by “Al-Qaeda 
Affiliates” and a supposed reluctance to deal with these issues by the administration.102 While 
both these arguments are orientated towards a counter jihad discourse, highlighting the 
security threat posed by Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and the apparent failure of the 
administration, on both counts the coverage is relatively muted compared with that of the 
CJN seed sites. For example, the article formulates the threat as coming from specific 
terrorist groups as opposed to either Muslims or Islam as a whole. Equally, whilst appearing 
to draw attention to the Obama administration’s failure to end the war on terror, the article 
does go on to acknowledge that:  
“As reluctant as the present administration may be to agree with Jones [the report’s 
author], they appear to recognize the pressing nature of the threat to national security 
posed by the proliferation of jihadist groups.” 103 
Although some articles can be read as partly supportive of the counter jihad narrative, much 
of the content of alternative news media sites can be viewed as being part of a more 
mainstream conservative, in particular US conservative, discourse. 
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Also present in the network are several individual figures that are difficult to include in the 
counter jihad nebula specifically, but fit with a more conservative or hawkish discourse that 
may be evident on partisan news sites. These figures include the academic Daniel Pipes, a 
noted critic of Islam who himself has been criticised by other academics for his position.104 
Pipes is difficult to group with other elements of the counter jihad, as he maintains a more 
moderate and nuanced position. Although very much concerned with security questions and 
the potential threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, in an article about the gains made in 
Iraq by the Islamic group ISIS in summer 2014 Pipes maintains that:  
“Thanks to the ferocious reputation ISIS has established in its capital city of Raqqa, 
Syria, and elsewhere, an estimated quarter of Mosul's population of almost two 
million has fled. The current round of ISIS brutality will newly render Islamism 
obnoxious to millions more Muslims.” 105 
Pipes goes on to reference several counter jihad tropes such as criticism of political 
leadership, castigating both Republican and Democratic parties for their failures, authorising 
the invasion of Iraq and believing that the death of Osama bin Laden put an end to the “war 
on terror” respectively. Despite this, Pipes’ overall discourse does not tessellate perfectly 
with that of the counter jihad nebula as a whole.  
Noise 
Finally, a number of sites could not be grouped easily with others. Some were humour and 
satire-based sites often with a conservative edge. For example, The People’s Cube published 
an article describing the decision of the Governor of California - Democrat Jerry Brown – to 
change the name of the state to “Caliphornia” and to describe himself as “Caliph”. Brown is 
quoted as saying:  
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“To honor and support the founding of the new, thriving Caliphate, and because we 
love all religions except Christianity, we will now follow Sharia law.”106  
The article is obviously satire, but the post also replicates almost exactly the central concern 
of wider counter jihad discourse, a threatened Islamic takeover with the consent of weak 
leaders. In addition, Dry Bones is a daily comic that has been produced since 1973. The 
content reflects a critical view of European and US attitudes towards Israel based on current 
events – for example one cartoon presents the Middle East as a “sea of Arabs that are trying 
to kill each other.”107  
In addition to satire, the network included a number of smaller blogs reflecting more personal 
perspectives on world affairs. Often these also reflected a conservative perspective but not 
always one expressly dominated by the counter jihad viewpoint. Examples include No 
Pasaran, seemingly the blog of an expat US citizens living in France, and the German centric 
blog Editrix Roncesvalles. Finally the network also included articles apparently unrelated to 
politics such as an article from The Atlantic: Why Songs Get Stuck in Your Head.108 
Hyperlink data is by definition noisy as web crawlers make no distinction between the links 
they crawl, and so even throwaway or casual links are captured. Although insisting on two in 
links has reduced the presence of seemingly extraneous links, those that have remained serve 
as a reminder that despite the seemingly narrow focus of the CJN core sites identified here, 
they are also capable of engaging with lines of thought outside of their central discourse.  
Conclusions 
This analysis is not comprehensive or all encompassing. The choice of seed sites and the 
limitations of web crawlers means that the network identified above is only a slice of a larger 
interconnected group of counter jihad thinkers, related media and other sites. The limitation 
of analysis to only three texts dated at the time of the web crawl further reduces this to a 
snapshot within a snapshot. In addition, available space means that only a tiny proportion of 
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the remaining texts can be considered here, and even then only in the form of brief examples. 
The CJN and related media (re)produces so much material so quickly that it is the work of 
years to capture and analyse it. Despite these limitations, this analysis has hopefully done 
much to improve our understanding of counter jihad discourse online and highlighted the 
connectedness of what is easy to assume are a relatively self-contained fringe group of 
activists.  
Building on previous analysis, including the work of Digital Methods Initiative, this study 
has attempted to consider the online counter jihad – the counter jihad nebula - as a subject in 
itself rather than as background noise to the more visible actions of counter jihad inspired 
terrorists, street movements and political parties.109 While these groups certainly present 
pressing policy problems for civil society, the wider ideology of the counter jihad scene is 
being crafted and maintained, in large part, online though the CJN. The combination of 
hyperlink and discourse analysis used here has offered a unique insight into not only the 
composition of the CJN, but also the nature of its discourse and how different elements of the 
network embrace different narratives or borrow from one another in creating discourse.  
Analysis of seed site texts reveals a discourse consistent with the current academic 
understanding of the counter jihad scene. The CJN shares an essentialist view of Islam in 
which all Muslims are engaged in hostile action or should be treated as such. It is profoundly 
distrustful of political and cultural elites and it understands itself primarily in cultural and 
religious rather than nationalistic or racial terms. In addition, the CJN maintains fierce 
support for Israel and the status of the Jewish community. More conflicted is the CJN’s 
relationship with the media. Many of the articles included in this analysis view the 
mainstream press as complicit with political elites and often refer to press coverage in 
derogatory terms and paint it as covering up the “real truth”. Despite this, a great deal of 
content harvested is based on mainstream press articles. CJN sites often reproduce articles 
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they agree with, even going so far as translating those not in English.110 Where core CJN sites 
reproduce articles they disagree with, it is to ridicule or dismiss them, for example Robert 
Spencer’s treatment of the Mail Online article.111 
In addition to reprinting material on CJN sites, the network has uncovered a considerable 
number of links to media sites outside of the core CJN sites. Gates of Vienna in particular 
maintains a regular press round up in which tipsters are encouraged to submit links. These 
tipsters include prominent counter jihad activist Fjordman.112 Very often these links have 
been to partisan press organs that, if not fully supportive of CJN discourse, are at least 
unlikely to contradict it. Where links are included to other media, these are carefully selected 
to carry a reader to a specific article. A major function of the CJN, in addition to ideological 
curation, seems to be to filter and cherry pick supportive articles from the media whilst 
ignoring, discrediting or explaining away contradictory ones. The CJN is the unofficial 
custodian of the counter jihad discourse, supporting it where they can and protecting it from 
criticism where necessary. If a reader were to stay within the confines of the CJN (by no 
means something to be taken for granted) they would likely arrive at a world-view 
significantly different from the one held by other citizens. On the question of discourse, this 
role is not exactly consistent with the closed echo chamber suggested by Sunstein.113 The 
pattern uncovered is closer to the more open model of the Breivik manifesto, borrowing and 
patching together a narrative from sometimes surprising sources.114 This is also notably 
supportive of Fekete’s and Kundnani’s suggestions of a societal blindspot for the impact of 
governmental security narratives on the legitimacy of the far and extreme right.115 
In the longer term this initial research on the CJN opens up a number of further research 
questions. Previous work and the experiences of Andreas Krieg support the connection 
between various defence leagues, political parties, Breivik and the CJN.116 However, this 
analysis has not done much to reinforce these connections beyond establishing a shared 
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discourse. None of these groups manifested in the network uncovered here, nor were they 
identified in texts collected. A more comprehensive analysis, or a different set of seed sites 
may do more to further establish these connections. The inclusion of so much mainstream 
and partisan media in the network also raises further questions about the degree to which 
media reporting is at least vulnerable to appropriation by counter jihadists. It is important to 
differentiate between the hard-core conspiratorial elements within the CJN and the sources 
they choose to link to. A tacit endorsement by Robert Spencer is a long way from full 
ideological affinity and should not be taken as such. Mainstream and partisan media sites 
may not fully endorse the essentialist view of Islam or the CJN’s sense of Western decline, 
but at times they do little to contradict it either. For all the connections drawn between the 
CJN and the actions of the wider counter jihad scene, it seems unlikely that a typical EDL 
foot soldier will be a dedicated reader of any part of the CJN. It is far more likely, however, 
that they will have viewed material in the mainstream media that does not challenge the 
overall discourse presented by the EDL. Distinguishing between these two narratives requires 
a level of nuance, sophistication and media literacy that is unlikely to be found in day-to-day 
public discourse. The CJN itself may be more a tool for opinion leaders than foot soldiers.117 
Finally, explicit references to the Eurabia conspiracy theory has been suspiciously absent 
from this analysis. Again, we must understand the limitations of this analysis in both time and 
scope, but the use of more generalised anti-elite and anti-Muslim sentiment in place of 
conspiracy is perhaps an indication that on a day-to-day level, the influence of Eurabia can be 
overestimated. Whilst the conspiracy may serve an important ideological function, for the 
“typical" counter jihad supporter it may well be of less relevance than more generalised fears 
based on cultural nationalism, security concerns and a fear of the other stoked by at times 
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